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1 Introduction
In the 1990s economic liberalisation replaced state
support for agriculture across much of Southern
Africa. As well as reducing costs, it was assumed
that liberalisation would ensure food availability
and access to food through positive effects on
production and trade incentives and on incomes.
However, subsequent experience has not matched
this vision: in December 2002, 16 million people
in the region (30 per cent of the population) were
declared in danger of running out of food.
But 2001–3 was not a one-off crisis caused solely
by two poor seasons.1Human impacts were broader
and deeper because of underlying chronic food
insecurity: available estimates suggest that around
half of the 16 million people at risk in 2002 are
food insecure every year.2 Over the last decade,
Southern Africa has made little progress towards
the Millennium Development Goal for reduction
in hunger (Table 1).Why is this so?
Food production across much of Southern
Africa, far from responding to liberalisation, has
declined over the last decade. With population
growth at 2–3 per cent per year, this represents a
significant decline in per capita domestic food
availability.With strong linkages between growth
in farming and related sectors in rural areas, the
decline in production has constrained rural growth
and incomes, limiting people’s means to buy food.
In this context of declining domestic food availability
and declining real incomes, market shortages
quickly translate into increased prices unaffordable
for many people.
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Table 1: Progress Towards Hunger Millennium Development Goal
Prevalence of child malnutrition Prevalence of undernourishment
(% U5 children below 2SD mean (% population below FAO
weight for age) recommended daily calorie intake)
1990 1995 2001 1990 1995 2001
Lesotho 15.8 21.4 17.8 27.0 26.0 25.0
Malawi 27.6 29.9 25.4 49.0 39.0 33.0
Mozambique – 27.0 – 69.0 62.0 53.0
Zambia 25.2 23.5 28.2 45.0 47.0 50.0
Zimbabwe 11.5 15.5 13.0 43.0 44.0 39.0
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (www.measuredhs.com); FAO (2003).
2 The “taming” of economic
reform in Southern Africa
Not all the blame for Southern Africa’s food
insecurity lies with the principle of economic
liberalisation. For example, the Mozambique
government does not intervene in private sector
movement of grain, it has minimal strategic grain
reserve capacity, yet the numbers of people short
of food during 2001–3 were the lowest in absolute
and proportionate terms across the region (SADC
FANR VAC 2003).
Some blame must lie with the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, which now affects more than 30 per cent
of adults in some Southern African countries.
HIV/AIDS has impacts on food production capacity
and income to buy food, and increases requirements
for quantity and quality of food (see Drinkwater,
this IDS Bulletin).
However, there is a strong case for suggesting
that the practice of economic liberalisation has been
a major factor contributing to food insecurity in
Southern Africa. This has two components. First,
mistakes have been made in applying economic
liberalisation in the circumstances of Southern
Africa. In particular, the extent and severity of the
“low-level equilibrium trap” limiting private sector
activity has been significantly underestimated (see
Dorward et al., this IDS Bulletin).
Second, there has been a “taming” of economic
liberalisation in SouthernAfrica, partly in response
to the perceived political harm posed by reform
(Jayne et al. 2002; Bird et al. 2003). Evidence and
analysis contributed to the Forum for Food Security
in Southern Africa suggest that a plausible
explanation for this lies in the continued influence
of neo-patrimonialism on policy implementation
in the region. This article focuses on how this can
be addressed.
3 Policy processes: distinguishing
the “what” from the “how”
Policy processes are usually considered to include
agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-
making, policy implementation and policy
evaluation.3 This goes beyond documents and
legislation to include activities on the ground.Only
if both agenda setting and formulation (policy
content) and decision-making and implementation
are sound, will policy processes have the potential
to deliver positive change. However it has been
compellingly argued that policy research onAfrican
agriculture has been overly concerned with the
“what” of policy, at the expense of the “how” of
processes and implementation (seeOmamo 2003;
Keeley and Scoones 2003; also Scoones, this IDS
Bulletin).
4 Politics and policy implementation
Widely mentioned reasons for poor implementation
of good policies include lack of financial and human
resources and inadequate incentive structures. The
influence of politics – and particularly the
configurations making up neo-patrimonial politics
(see below) – has receivedmuch less attention.4We
are not suggesting these other reasons should be
ignored; rather, we seek to demonstrate that neo-
patrimonialism also contributes to poor
implementation of food security policies in Southern
Africa and this needs to be acknowledged more
explicitly.
The concept of neo-patrimonialism has been
used in studies of the political science ofAfrica since
the 1970s, and is increasingly accepted as part of
the political landscape within the region (see
Olukushi, this IDS Bulletin).A neo-patrimonial state
is a “hybrid regime”, wheremodern bureaucracies
coexist beside ‘political authority [that]…is based
on the giving and granting of favours … that go
from the village level to the highest reaches of the
central state’ (van deWalle 2001: 51). That aid can
support neo-patrimonial states is becoming
increasingly obvious.
The authority of the ruling regime depends on
the distribution of socio-economic resources to
clients, rather than on “legal-rational” mechanisms
such as the rule of law, meritocracy and political
accountability. Power is centralised around a single
individual and their close associates, with ultimate
control over most clientelist networks.These people
‘personally exert discretionary power over a big
share of the state’s resources’ (van deWalle 2001:
52). Government is accountable primarily for its
performance as dispenser of patronage, and not for
the implementation of policies. Those that do not
belong to clientelist networks suffer a significant
lack of voice in policy processes. In much of sub-
SaharanAfrica,patrimonial practices of personalised
exchange, clientelism and political corruption have
become internalised in formal political institutions
and provide ‘essential operating codes for politics’
(Bratton and van deWalle 1997: 63).
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A recent review of politics and food security in
five countries in Southern Africa (Bird et al. 2003)
indicates that, even when strengthening long-term
food security is a clearly stated policy objective and
policies have been formulated to address this,
implementation is significantly determined by the
opportunity to support clientelist relations. For
example, state-subsidised agricultural credit in
Zambia has represented a form of patronage to
small-scale farmers and was seen to be an important
mechanism for ensuring continued support for the
ruling party in the run-up to the 1996 elections.
While the distribution of cheap credit was declared
policy, there was a de facto policy of not enforcing
repayments. These political priorities within a neo-
patrimonial setting had huge opportunity costs in
terms ofmaintaining uneconomicmaize production
and diverting state resources from investment in
long-term economic development.
Politics provides the context for policy-making
in any country, and rightly so. However neo-
patrimonial politics have the distinctive quality of
structuring policy implementation in a way that
systematically diverts public resources for private
gain. This frequently leads to inferior
implementation, undermining development
possibilities that are already restricted by social and
economic constraints. In SouthernAfrica’s case, the
failure to stop eight million people from running
the risk of food shortage each year.
5 Changing policy processes:
implications for development
practice
An important first step in creating a positive policy
environment for addressing food security in
Southern Africa is for all development partners to
accept that neo-patrimonialism is a significant
influence on policy implementation, and to act
deliberately to control its influence.
How can this be done? To date, “lack of political
will” to implement policy has either been treated as
an exogenous variable in the policy process, or
identified solutions have focusedondirect intervention
in the political process. The authors suggest there is
a third line of attack focused on influencing policy
processes. This builds on the RAPID (Research and
Policy in Development) framework (see Figure 1;
Young and Court 2004), according to which three
broad groups of factors influence policy processes:
the political context, the evidence for change, and
the links between them.Evidence suggests that, while
political context seems to be the most important
influence on the policy process, outcomes can be
influencedby provision ofbetter evidence and links.
Attempts are being made to influence policy
processes in this way, both within individual
countries and within important regional institutions.
TheMalawi case (Box 1) illustrates how building
accountability and inclusivity into policy processes
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Figure 1: The RAPID Framework
External influences
International factors,
economic and cultural
influences, etc.
Links between policy-
makers and other stake-
holders, relationships,
voice trust, networks,
the media and other
intermediaries, etc.
The Context – political
structures/processes,
institutional pressures,
prevailing concepts, policy
streams and windows, etc.
The Evidence,
credibility, methods,
relevance, use, how the
message is packaged
and communicated,
etc.
helps to improve effectiveness. In the same way,
but at a broader, continental level, the peer review
mechanism at the centre of the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) provides an
African voice on political and economic governance
in participating countries, again building processes
of accountability into the policy process, explicitly
aimed at offsetting tendencies to neo-patrimonialism
(see www.nepad.org/en/htm).
6 Practical approaches
Several techniques can be used to gather evidence
about and publicise the influence of politics on the
policy process and deviation from implementation
plans. These include: political context mapping, to
understand the nature of formal and informal policy
processes at district or national level (Court and
Cotterrell 2005, forthcoming); context assessment
tools such as stakeholder mapping, influence
mapping and triangle analysis (Start andHovland
2004); and outcome mapping, which focuses on
changes in behaviour, relationships, action and
activities in target organisations.5
In many countries, there are very few formal
associations autonomous from government, and
civil society is weak andmarginalised. Even where
trade unions, community development associations
and business associations exist, these are often
marginalised from policy processes or co-opted by
government into patron–client relations.
Increasing the flow of accessible information
about proposed policies to the social groups that
they affect can help these groups to exercise their
rights. Successful examples of these include the
Zambia Civil Society for Poverty Reduction’s
dissemination of translated summaries of Zambia’s
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (CSPR 2004) and
theMalawi Economic JusticeNetwork’s economic
and budget literacy project, which has distributed
simplified versions of the National Budget and
Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
to grassroots members, MPs, government officials
and donors (MEJN 2005a).
Effective watchdog organisations are important
for monitoringandpublicising inappropriateactivities.
Formal watchdog organisations may be co-optedby
the state, but organisations andmechanisms controlled
by civil society organisations canbemore successful.
For example, inMalawi, the Board of the National
Food Reserve Agency was weakened by political
appointees who were unable to resist instructions to
release grain from the StrategicGrainReserve during
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In February 2002, Malawi set up a national Joint Task Force (JTF) to deal with the food crisis and
produce a revised long-term food and nutrition policy. In contrast to past government-dominated
processes, the JTF included multiple stakeholders. A Food Security and Nutrition Policy
Subcommittee (FSNPS) was charged with producing the revised national food and nutrition policy
and facilitating ownership and participation.
Stakeholder consultations focused on sharing knowledge and insights, and building an evidence
base among a linked group of actors and networks. Consultations included regional workshops for
local government, traditional authorities and civil society. Community consultations were also held
nationwide through the civil society agriculture network, using an adapted form of citizens’ jury based
on Malawi’s traditional bwalo community discussion forum (CISANET 2004). A national workshop
involved key stakeholders including community representatives and international experts.
Parliamentary Committees on Agriculture and Public Accounts met to ensure the legislature is
involved in the process and to build consensus. By early 2005, a policy and action plan was being
agreed for presentation to Cabinet for the July 2005 Budget.
Overall, the JTF approach had positive results: it increased genuine cooperation in addressing the
food crisis; and it increased leadership and commitment from government, who gained confidence
from the multi-stakeholder approach. The consultation process was useful in ensuring the needs of
different stakeholders were represented, especially the community consultation, which produced new
insights into rural families’ priority food security concerns. A key lesson on ownership was that the
inter-Ministerial composition of the Task Force was crucial, given the problems experienced in the past
with leadership on food and nutrition security issues in Malawi.
Box 1: Food Security Policy Review Process in Malawi
the food crisis, in contravention of the agreed policy
(EconomicResources Ltd andErnst &Young 2003).
In contrast, theMalawi Economic JusticeNetwork’s
ServiceDelivery SatisfactionSurveys have contributed
to holding government to account for PRSP
implementation (MEJN 2005b).
7 External influences: implications
for donors
There are five important lessons from Southern
Africa’s experience regarding the contribution of
donors to poor policy implementation:
1. Donors must invest in their own learning about
the drivers of change in different political and
economic systems.6 The “lack of political will”
commonly cited as an implementation constraint
is amanifestation of complex historical processes
which vary from country to country. These
underlying drivers need to be understood and
addressed if the aid relationship is to contribute
to taming rather than fuelling neo-patrimonial
tendencies to divert policy implementation.
2. Donors must be willing to invest in long-term
market development, not only to bring the
potential benefits of economic liberalisation to
regions suffering from the low-level equilibrium
trap (see Dorward et al., this IDS Bulletin), but
also to counter neo-patrimonial tendencies
towards  exerting discretionary power over a big
share of state resources.
3. Donors should invest in and be supportive of
approaches and tools to increase the voice and
effectiveness of civil society in policy processes
at national and regional level.
4. Donors must consider the patronage potential
of different policy instruments. For example,
the potential for inefficiencies in supply-side
instruments, such as subsidised food and
agricultural inputs, is high. In Southern Africa,
significant local-level diversion has been recorded
inMalawi, for example, in the Targeted Inputs
Programme (Levy and Barahona 2002). Direct
welfare transfers such as allowances andpensions
could strengthen access and be more efficient
(Harvey 2005).
5. All these considerations are relevant to current
debates on aid effectiveness.7 Donors havemoral
and economic obligations to ensure that aid
funds can be used effectively: decisions about
aid volumes, criteria for allocating aid resources,
and choice of aid instruments need to bear in
mind the likely influence of neo-patrimonialism
on the policy process.Donors must accept that
they are sometimes part of the problem, by their
channelling of large aid flows through weak
government systems.
These lessons mean that donors need to focus
not only on increasing aid, but also on the political
context of aid delivery, and on the support of policy
instruments that are effective for alleviating poverty
and strengthening food security in thepolitical reality
of poor countries. These lessons are particularly
relevant in 2005, when the Africa Commission is
reporting on how rich nations can best support
Africa’s development efforts, and theUNMillennium
Review is considering how best the international
community can support progress towards
achievement of theMillenniumDevelopment Goals.
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Notes
* In this articleevidence is drawnfromfivecountries inSouthern
Africa, collectedby theForumfor FoodSecurity inSouthern
Africa andpersonal experienceofMalawi’s current National
Food andNutrition Security Policy review. Responsibility
for specific suggestions in this article lies with the authors
alone.We are indebted to the Forum stakeholders, and to
the UK Department for International Development for
funding.Forumdocuments areavailableat www.odi.org.uk/
food-security-forum(accessedApril 2005).
1. The poor harvests weremoderate in historical perspective:
mostly 10–25 per cent shortfall on the previous five-year
average, compared with the 65 per cent shortfall in
1991–2 (FFSSA 2004).
2. There are few published estimates. This figure comes
from CARE and is supported by country level estimates
for Malawi in Levy (2003).
3. For more on policy processes, see www.odi.org.uk/rapid.
Also seeHill (1997) for a reader andKeeley and Scoones
(2003) for an African perspective.
4. See Bird et al. (2003), from which much of the material
in this section is drawn.
5. See http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-9330-201-1-DO_TOPIC.
html for more on outcome mapping.
6. For more on drivers of change analysis, see www.grc-
exchange.org/g_themes/politicalsystems_drivers.html
7. For a summary of aid effectiveness issues in Africa, see
www.odi.org.uk/publications/opinions/30_aid_africa_jan
05.html
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